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 1. Introduction 
 A common theme in a number of recent World Bank working papers is the 
feedback between investment in a developing or evolving economy and financial 
market reforms enacted by the country.  Investment brings about reform.  Reform 
brings about further investment.  Some examples are Meigas (2001), Dollar (2002), 
Claessens et al. (2003), and Grais and Kantur (2003).  Development can only be 
successful if there is a constant flow of sufficient funds to bring about the next stage 
in reform.  If the reform stalls then the value of the initial investment will likely 
plummet.  A decentralized market based approach to investing may not develop the 
coordination required to bring about the optimal outcome.  A developing country 
with a sound program of reform may experience the equivalent of a bank run if 
independent investors nervously fear that other investors have lost confidence. 
 Financial market risk is typically captured by an exogenous randomly 
determined terminal value or dividend stream; however, what these examples 
highlight is the endogeneity of intrinsic value.  Therefore, the risk each investor faces 
includes risk associated with the uncertainty of the investment activities of the rest of 
the market.  The objective of this paper is to explore the interaction between 
individuals and the market when the asset's intrinsic value is determined 
endogenously. 
 The investment process becomes a coordination game.  The initial condition 
distinguishing, for example, Latvia from Lithuania at the time of the break up of the 
Soviet Union may be less important than the progression of investment and reform 
that occurs within each country.  If one country becomes the "hot" investment area, 
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 then the influx of funds spurs greater reform, creating a self-fulfilling confirmation of 
the positive designation.  Froot et al. (2001) find empirical evidence in support of a 
bidirectional feedback between the flow of funds and returns. 
 Similar issues can be found in technology models with spillovers.  Moretto 
(2000) examines a model with network effects in which adopting a popular 
technology is less expensive than adopting technology alone.  One extension of the 
model explores the possibility that early adoption offers a higher payoff than late 
adoption.  There are thus competing motivations for those considering the timing of 
technology adoption: acting later offers a cost savings and lowers risk while acting 
earlier offers greater payoff.  The key feature to make this analysis relevant to the 
current work is that the technology typically requires sustained investment over an 
extended period of time. 
 Herding tends to be associated with inefficient outcomes.  As explored by 
Froot et al. (1992) and Hirshleifer et al. (1994), herding refers to investors selecting 
to gather and trade based on the same information set, even though other information 
is available and potentially more accurate in revealing the intrinsic value of an asset.  
The setting developed in this paper demonstrates that herding behavior by investors 
may be the best of the available options, serving as a coordination devise in a setting 
in which coordination is more important than project selection. 
 Another form of herding, momentum trading, refers to investors buying and 
selling in response to a respective upward or downward trend in the price of an asset.  
DeLong et al. (1990), Hong and Stein (1999), and Barberis and Shleifer (2003) 
include momentum traders in markets with fundamental traders.  The momentum 
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 traders tend to create excessive momentum, so that the price overreacts to new 
market information. 
 Herding has been used in international finance to explain currency crisis in 
developing countries.  In particular, Banerjee (1992), Bikchandani et al. (1992), 
Caplin and Leahy (1994), Calvo and Mendoza (1996), and Chari and Kohoe (2003), 
argue that herding is the natural result of asymmetric information.  Less informed 
investors rely on market information to reveal private fundamental information.  
Arifovic and Masson (2004) develop a model in which traders with heterogeneous 
expectations of the return offered by a developing country learn through imitation of 
more successful strategies.  The flow of investor sentiment cause cycles of success, 
optimism, devaluation, and pessimism, restarting the cycle. 
 The model presented in this paper is a general exploration of a feedback 
between the popularity of an investment project and the ability of the project to 
develop through to completion.  The time to full development is determined by the 
rate of investment in the project.  The project’s intrinsic value is endogenous through 
the length of the development time. 
2. Analytical Development of the Model 
 Consider an adaptation of Lucas (1978).  Output, Dt, is produced by mt 
distinct "mature" production units.  The output is perishable and may be used for 
consumption, ct, or investment, it.  In addition to the mt mature units, there exists a 
pool of K immature units, referred to as "projects".  The immature units are not 
currently capable of production, but with the investment of resources can be 
developed into mature production units.  The rate of growth of a project depends on 
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 the rate of resource expenditure on its development, .  Projects developed to 
maturity are replaced by new immature projects. 
k
ti
2.1 The central planner's optimization problem 
 Assume a single decision maker for the economy maximizing an aggregate 
utility function.  In continuous time, 
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 The total output at time t is that which is produced by the initial production 
units, D0, plus for time t, t(k-1) < t ≤ t(k), the output of the mt = (k-1) matured 
projects.  Once mature, project k produces at a constant rate, .  Productivity upon 
maturity is unknown until the time of maturity with  characterized by  = 
 and standard deviation σ
kD
kD )( kDE
md d.  If σd = 0 then the maturity value is known and (1c) 
simplifies to . mt dkDD )1(0 −+=
 Prior to maturity, project k's level of development is measured by dtk, the time 
t “shadow” output.  The project grows based on the magnitude and productivity of 
the resources invested as captured by equation (1d).  As reflected in (1e), the project 
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 reaches maturity when dtk reaches size .  The kmd th project to mature does so at the 
endogenously determined time t = t(k), or simply tk for convenience. 
 The current state is defined by the current economic output, Dt, and the degree 
of development of the existing set of K projects.  Vector dt = {Dt, , , … , 







 The utility function satisfies the standard assumption of separability and 
continuous differentiability with u'(ct) > 0 and u''(ct) < 0.  The productivity of 
investment function satisfies f(it) ≥ 0, f '(it) > 0, and f ''(it) ≤ 0 with f(0) = 0. 
 To solve the optimization problem, it is convenient to divide the problem into 
time intervals delineated by the time of completion of a project, 
  V(d0) = . (2) K+++ ∫∫∫ ρ−ρ−ρ− 322110, )()()(max tt tttt ttt ttic dtcuedtcuedtcueEktt
The value at time t = t(k-1) can be conveniently expressed as  
  V(dt(k-1)) =  (3) ∫ τ ρτ−ρ− +k tkkttic VedtcueEktt 0, )()(max d
with τk = tk – t(k-1).  Solve the optimal control problem implied by (3) treating 
 as the salvage value in order to find the conditions for the optimal 
investment path within the time frame t(k-1) ≤ t < tk.  The first order condition, the 















cuV d(ρ−=λ tkkt e , which imply an optimal investment path such that 
itk satisfies the equation1 
                                                          
1 Investment in project k during this interval t(k-1) < t ≤ t(k) changes the t(k) without changing V(dtk).  
Investing in project j ≠ k does not change t(k), but does change the state dtk at the start of the next 
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 for each j = k….k+K. (4) 
The present value co-state λ  is the multiplier function on (1d).  The consumption 
rate  represents optimal consumption as t → tk from below, c  = 
.  It will be useful to define the optimal consumption rate  as 
consumption at a time arbitrarily close to tk after maturity,  = 
.  The term V  is the current value of the agent's 











































 Equation (4) is not yet a reduced form solution for the optimal investment 
path as V  remains endogenous to the consumption decision.  Further discussion 
of the solution process is contained in the appendix.
)( tkd
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 The co-state λ  reflects the tradeoff between time t consumption utility and 
the expected future benefit of additional investment in project k.  The value of λ  is 
anchored by the terminal condition that sets e .  
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t is increased, the loss in contemporaneous consumption utility must be 
negated by the earlier arrival of the salvage value.  Equation (4) reflects the trade-off 
                                                                                                                                                                     
interval.  The value of the state variable at the start of the next interval is simply the discounted value 
of completing the next project, thus making V(dtk) a pass through for the value of completing project j 
at t(j). 
2 appendices are available on the JEBO website 
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 between utility at time t and the benefits to completing the project at time tk.3 
Assumption A. Assume u(ct) and f(it) such that along the optimal consumption path, 
both i and c are weakly increasing as the economy’s resources increase. 
 Assumption A is necessary to prevent the economy from driving consumption 
to zero, either through over investment or over consumption of the economy’s output.  
In a related setting, Dixit et al. (1975) find the conditions that produce sustainable 
rates of growth in consumption and saving as the continuous saving produces discrete 
jumps in income.  Assumption A is also sufficient to create an environment in which 
sequential development of projects is superior to simultaneous development. 
Proposition 1. The optimal investment strategy concentrates investment in a single 
project rather than distributing funds across multiple projects. 
Proof: See appendix available on the JEBO website. 
 The proof establishes that the marginal benefit of investing in a project 
increases with the rate of investment and thus resources are better used by 
concentrating on a single project.  The choice between sequential development and 
simultaneous development is a choice about when the project will be realize, not 
whether it will be realized.  Sequential development brings about production of one 
project without delaying the maturity date of the others.  Of course, given sequential 
development, it is better to develop the most productive projects first, but in choosing 
between sequential and simultaneous, it is better to have developed a low 
productivity project at tk followed by a higher productivity project at t(k+1) than it is 
to have both projects mature simultaneously at t(k+1). 
                                                          
3 A more intuitive expression results if ct is constant: tkt >∀ , .  In this case, ρ  
simplifies to  allowing  to represent the PDV of instantaneous increase in utility produced by 
bringing the time of maturity a moment closer. 
+= tkt cc )( tkV d
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  A number of benefits arise if investment decisions are directed by a single 
decisions maker.  Primarily, the investor need not be concerned with the uncertainty 
induced by the unknown behavior of other investors.  The joint venture between the 
World Bank and the Government of Sweden discussed by Meigas may benefit from 
such an arrangement. 
2.2 Independent investor 
Now consider the same set of investment opportunities but in a market in 
which N independent investors, indexed Nn ,...,1= , invest in order to maximize 
individual utility.  The individual investor solves 
  V  =  (5a) ) K+++ ∫∫∫ ρ−ρ−ρ− 322110, )()()(max tt ntttt nttt nttic dtcuedtcuedtcueEktt( 0nd
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The new term  represents investor n’s percent ownership of the completed project 
k.  Prior to maturity,  tracks the investor’s percent ownership as it evolves during 







 stock in the project at the rate dStk,n at price Ptk.  The total number of shares sold to 
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Here,  and λ  are the multipliers on (5d) and (5f) respectively.  The impact 
investment has on the timing of the project’s maturity is captured by  in an 

























∂−ρ− )()( d , captures the impact 
investment has on the investor’s percent ownership of the project and how that 








 term in (6) 
accounts for the cost of acquiring ownership.  Taken together, the RHS of (6) 
captures the sum discounted value of the impact today’s investment decision has on 
the investor’s own future utility. 
 An individual’s investing brings about externalities for the other investors.  
As a positive externality, investment in a project brings it closer to completion, 
benefiting all shareholders.  A negative externality arises as agent n’s increased 
ownership in a project dilutes the ownership of the other investors.  The completion 
time of tk in λa and λb, and the individual investor’s percent ownership, φ , in the nkt ,
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 second term of (6) become dependent on the behavior of others.  As a result, the time 
to completion of each project and the share ownership are subject to the expectations 
operator in (6). 
 In (4), only V  is unknown to the central planner, reflecting the 
uncertainty in the terminal value of the project.  Unlike the central planner, the 
individual investor can benefit from diversification.  There is an opportunity cost to 
concentrating investment in a slow developing project.  Distributing funds increases 
the chance of investing with the herd of other investors when the investment 
objective of the herd is unknown to the individual. 
)( tkd
 Another counter-productive incentive present in the individual’s problem but 
not the central planner’s is that λ  encourages the investor to put funds into those 
projects in which ownership can be acquired cheaply.  The pricing of the investment 
project has not yet been discussed, but if shares in less developed projects are priced 
lower than those of more mature projects then the incentive underlying  leads to 
investing in less developed projects, all else equal.  Thus, both the incentive to invest 
in soon-to-be-completed projects and the incentive to buy into projects cheaply 
appear in the RHS of (6) and can be in conflict. 
b
bλ
2.2.1 A Rational Expectations Equilibrium 
 A REE can be created by imposing sufficiently favorable structure on the 
environment.  Simplify the investment problem involve only the distribution of funds 
between projects;  is a fixed proportion of income.  Allow that , 














, ∀≥ω nkt ,,
11 
  Consider a homogeneous population of investors who differ only in the 
private signal on the value of each undeveloped project.  Investor n receives signal 
  nkkkn EDY ,, =  
or, in logarithms 
   with . (8) nkknk eDy ,, )ln( += ),0(~ 2, enk Ne σ
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 In a K = 2 setting, consider projects A and B.  Let 
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 To simplify notation further, allow that ω  = ω  and thus (1- ω ) = ω .  










n that maps investor n’s private information into an 
investment strategy, ω  = . nt )( ntn sh
Condition ∆:  The function hn is monotonically increasing, , with h]1,0[∈nh n(0) = 
1/2 and symmetric about hn(0). 
 Consider the special case of K = 2, N = 2.  The setting is now one of a 
cooperative game.  Knowledge of both one’s own hn and the opponent’s h-n ensures 
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 that observed i  is fully revealing of the opponent’s private signal.  Once both 
investors know both signals, they can reevaluate η by computing .  With 
this shared estimate, the two investors can coordinate on the project believed to have 
the greater maturity value.  Assume common knowledge so that each investor’s h
k
t
),|( 21 tt ssE η
n 
function is known to both investors.  The resulting coordination represents a 
dominant Nash Equilibrium. 
 As the primary project approaches maturity, there may be incentive such that 
both investors deviate from this cooperative investment path to invest in the low cost 
immature project. 
Proposition 2: A fully revealing equilibrium does not exist for N > 2 or K > 2. 
Proof:  A fully revealing equilibrium requires a unique mapping from the unobserved 
state to observed market behavior.  Consider Yt = { , the set of all time t signals 
that combine to produce investment  according to each individual investor’s 
application of the shared h.  Expectations are linear in the signals, but according to 
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 As a counter example, consider N = 3 and K = 2.  Assume common 
knowledge and a shared function h.  A realization of  and  means 
that .  For the market to indicate this equivalence with an initial 
 requires that  for all values of .  This requires 
linearity in h in contradiction to Condition ∆.  Likewise, an observed i  need 
not be the result of a set of signals resulting in .  At best, the 
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 initial observation of aggregate investment would allow the individual investor to 
calculate a posterior distribution of the underlying relative value of the assets.  
Beliefs would then have to be updated based on continued observation of aggregate 
investment with the agent accounting for the evolving beliefs of the other agents as 
they also incorporate aggregate investment into their own beliefs.  It seems 
implausible that such a REE could be established in practice based on the degree of 
dependence on the rational behavior of all of the other agents in a complex 
environment. 
3. Simulation 
 Faced with the uncertainty in the decisions made by the other market 
participants and the implausibility of a REE in a generalized setting, two rule of 
thumb approaches to investing seem reasonable and consistent with the objectives of 
the rational investor in a non-rational setting.  Each reflects one of the two competing 
investment motivations captured by λa and λb.  Fundamental investors compute the 
present discounted value of each project based on an estimate of when the project 
will be completed and its estimated value upon completion.  They distribute funds 
based on the relative present discounted value and the confidence in their ranking.  
Momentum investors distribute funds between projects based on past realized returns.  
Both approaches are examined in simulation independently and then in a mixed 
market populated by both types of investors. 
3.1 Overview of the simulated model 
 The simulated model starts the economy with an initial set of complete 
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 projects (M0) that produce an aggregate output (D0).  The population of N investors 
distribute funds between K projects.  Initially, each investor is an equal owner of the 
economy’s output.  Ownership of a project under development is based on the 
percent ownership of the outstanding shares the project has issued.  Shares are 
purchased by investors at a price that reflects the level of development, .  
A project has been completed when the shadow dividend,  reaches “maturity 
level”, .  Upon completion, the project begins paying a dividend , that is 
divided among investors based on ownership.  Investors save at a constant savings 









 Table 1: Simulation parameter values 
D0 = 100 Initial aggregate output 
M0 = 100 Initial number of productive projects 
K = 10 Number of projects under development at any given time 
N = 20 Size of investor population 
T = 500 Time a which the simulation is terminated.  Number of time 
steps to reach T depends on the evolution of the market. 
dt0 = 1/20 Initial time-step size per iteration 
d0 = 0.005 Initial value of a new project.  See price below. 
)ln( kD  ~ N(-.5,1) Contribution to output of a project upon maturity.  The 
specification produces E( ) = d  = 1. kD m
ρ = 0.05 Discount rate 
sav = s  tD Savings, s = .005 
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ρ= /),max( 0 ktkt ddp  Price determined by fundamental value.  Implies perfectly 
elastic supply of shares during the project's development. 
 
 Investor n determines a level of investment in project k based on the project’s 
anticipated relative performance, .  The degree to which the investor is willing to 
concentrate his or her funds into the project with the greatest anticipated performance 
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4 Once a project has been present for 300 time steps, the growth rate is examined.  If the net growth 
since t-50 is less than 5% (i.e. dtk < (1+δ)*  ), then the project is considered abandoned and a new 




 The k x n matrix Ωt contains weights for which each column sums to one.  With β  = 
0, investor n has no confidence in his or her ability to select which of the available 
projects offers the greatest return, and thus distributes funds equally between the 
projects, = 1/k.  A higher level of β indicates a greater confidence in his or her 
project selecting ability, allowing for greater concentration of investment funds on 
the project with the greatest anticipated performance.  Thus as ,  for 
the highest ranked project and ω  for the others.  Investors start the simulation 
tentatively with β  = 0.  As the simulation progresses, they adjust β  to reflect the 






















The variable  is a measure of the investor’s past accuracy.  The specific 
computation differs by investment strategy, so further discussion is reserved for the 
following two sections. 
n
tπ
 For manageability, there is no selling of shares by individuals.  During the 
development stage shares are available from the project and are provided with perfect 
elasticity at the market price.  The reward to ownership is realized through dividend 
payments once the project matures. 
 In simulation, the continuous time behavior is approximated by small discrete 
time steps.  As the economy's wealth increases, the rate at which projects are 
completed increases as well.  To accommodate, the length of each time step 
decreases in inverse proportion to the rate of aggregate output, . tt YYdtdt /00=
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 3.1.1 Fundamental investors 
 The investor receives a signal,  as defined in (8).  The investor estimates 
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The divisor lk is the number of signals received concerning the value of project k.  
Trader n thus expects project k to have a maturity value of 











 To compute the present discounted value, each investor also models project 
development over time.  The model provides a forecast of the completion date that 
the investor uses to discount the value of each project.  Each project is assumed by 
the investors to grow at a rate that is dependent on its rank by size.  The project of 
rank r (r=1 indicating the smallest project) grows at rate rθ , .  The 
investors estimate these growth rates based on historical data generated by the 




t dd )1(1 θ+=+
rθ  by estimating the  coefficients of 
the transition equation 
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 rank of a project is less than or equal to i.  The coefficients are updated during the 
course of the simulation according to a least-squares learning algorithm.  (See Marcet 
and Sargent 1989.) 
 The model produces a time to completion estimate 




























τˆ  for 2 ≤ j ≤ K. (18b) 
The fundamental investors estimate the present value of each project as 
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Here, ntv  and  are the sample mean and standard deviation of estimated 
performance across projects as measured by investor n in period t. 
n
tsv
 Fundamental traders update their individual β  each time a project matures.  
Success for a fundamental investor is measured by whether the project he or she 
believed to be the highest present valued project during the course of development 
turned out to have the highest present value.  Each time a project matures the 
investors rank the existing projects, including the one that just matured, using 






 highest ranked project.  Let κtk represent the proportion of the time steps between t(k-
1) and tk in which the investor correctly chose the project with the highest valuation 
at time tk.  The value of π is updated according to equation 
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The investors are not social planners.  They evaluate their performance based on the 
market outcome.  Whether the market did a good job in selecting which project to 
develop is beyond the individual investor’s control and is not a component of his or 
her performance measure. 
3.1.2 Momentum investors 
 The momentum investors attempt to select the project offering the highest one 
period ahead return, 







Investors received private information  ~ N(0,1).  The momentum investors index 
















, )( +++== +
The coefficients are updated according to the standard least-squares learning 
algorithm with initial values set to zero. 
 The momentum investors measure success each period by whether they 
correctly selected the project with the highest realized paper returns.  Thus, for the 
momentum investors πt is the proportion of periods in which the project producing 
the highest return is correctly identified.  There is a disconnect between perceived 
investment success and the realization of returns since the measured performance 
depends on paper return that may never be realized. 
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 3.2 Simulation results 
 Simulations 1 and 2 are populated by fundamental investors.  Simulation 3 is 
populated by momentum investors.  Simulations 4 and 5 are populated by a mix of 
both investor types.  The mean and population standard deviation of basic economic 
performance and the investor accuracy are reported in Table 2.  The data are 
generated from 100 iterations based on independent draws of project values.  Each 
simulation is applied to the same set of 100 series of realizations.  The figures that 
follow display the results of a single typical simulation outcome (iteration run 
number 5). 
Table 2: Accuracy and economic performance 
Averages and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of economic performance 
measures.  100 iterations of each simulation.  Each simulation set is based on the 
same 100 series of randomly determined projects. 
    Associated Accuracy     Momentum
Sim Description Figures F M DT MT Ownership 
0 Base --- --- --- 1293.43 1287.01 --- 
      --- --- (160.70) (124.19) --- 
1 Fundamental  1, 2, 3 0.9988 --- 6020.71 3619.86 --- 
  noise-free signal   (0.0012) --- (1033.28) (586.29) --- 
2 Fundamental  4, 5 0.6257 --- 2534.01 1937.60 --- 
  noisy signal, σ(e)2=100   (0.0107) --- (441.16) (297.17) --- 
3 Momentum 6, 7 --- 0.9815 140.62 142.11 --- 
      --- (0.0018) (169.23) (174.09) --- 
4 Both 8, 9 0.9420 0.9639 3492.08 2206.66 0.3647
  noise-free signal   (0.0415) (0.0121) (905.13) (588.19) (0.0281)
5 Both ---- 0.3925 0.9792 989.34 616.21 0.6046
  noisy signal, σ(e)2=100   (0.0274) (0.0112) (157.33) (75.74) (0.0132)
6 Fundamental  ---- 0.8021 --- 4088.11 2732.87 --- 
  δ=0.2, σ(e)2=10   (0.0043) --- (671.64) (411.3176) --- 
7 Both 10 0.6092 0.9535 3566.11 2243.40 0.2273
  δ=0.2, σ(e)2=10   (0.0068) (0.0077) (542.50) (303.40) (0.0111)
 
3.2.1 Simulations with fundamental investors 
 Simulation 0 establishes a base level of performance.  A single project is 
developed without knowledge of its maturity value.  This is equivalent to 
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 development under a central planner who can coordinate investing but does not have 
access to information signaling .  The fact that DkD T and MT are approximately 
equal is a reflection of the failure to select projects based on maturity value. 
 In comparison to the base case, developing the same set of projects 
simultaneously results in a smaller number of mature projects producing less output.  
On average, sequential development produces 47 more projects by the end simulation 
than does simultaneous development.  The minimum difference over the 100 runs is 
35 additional projects produced by sequential development. 
 For the first set of simulations σe is set to zero so that the investors receive a 
perfect signal about the value of each project upon completion.  The investing 
behavior of the other market participants is thus the only source of uncertainty.  
Figure 1 plots the values of rθ , r = 1, … K, during the course of the simulation.  The 
figure shows that the smallest project maintains a growth rate of about 2.5% while, 
initially, all other projects attain nearly zero growth.5  Over the course of the 
simulation the investors learn to favor the largest project, which becomes reflected in 
the rise of the largest project’s estimated growth rate.  Towards the end of the sample, 
projects that are well-developed grow quickly, reinforcing the learning.  Investors 
quickly learn to invest in the most promising projects; and thus any well developed 
project is one that the market has determined to have high value upon completion.  
The benefit to aggregate performance derived from the ability to select projects is 
reflected in DT > MT. 
 The top frame of Figure 2 plots the time-series of dtk for each project taken 
                                                          
5 The high growth rate in the smallest project reflects the greater percent change induced by a small 
rate of investment rather than an indication of a high rate of investment.  Maintaining growth in a large 
project requires greater investment. 
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 from the first 1000 time steps of the simulation.  The level of development of the 
initial 10 projects is determined randomly.  The lower frame plots the  for each 
project (the vertical axis is a log scale).  The learning process and the increased 
confidence in the investor’s ability to predict can be seen in these early periods as the 
investors increasingly concentrate their funding towards the project with the greatest 
.  Figure 3 plots the same information for the last 1000 time steps of the 
simulation.  In the late periods, investors are confident about their ability to select 
correctly which project to invest in.  In all of the simulations, long dormant projects 
are cleared to allow replacement by a new undeveloped project.  This clearing 
prevents projects that are not of interest to the investors from crowding out the 
introduction of new projects. 
kD
kD
 Simulation 2 sets  = 100.  In this noisy signal version of the model, 
investors possess heterogeneous information about which project has the greatest 
value.  Because these errors tend to average out, the market still tends to develop the 
correct project, but individual investors experience errors in project selection, 
resulting in a lower β and thus less concentration of investment funds. 
2
eσ
 Figure 4 reveals the inability of the investors to coordinate investing efforts 
on a single project.  Figure 5 reveals that the investors end up developing clusters of 
projects.  Low individual confidence results in a distribution of funds across projects.  
The highest valued project attracts the greatest level of investment and grows the 
fastest, but other projects also receive funding. 
3.2.2 Simulations with momentum investors 
 Simulation 3 is based on a market populated by momentum investors.  Figure 
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 6 displays the initial learning and confidence building of the investors as they 
correctly select the project offering the highest returns.  Momentum investors are 
attracted to two features in a project, a high rate of development (momentum) and a 
low level of development.  Momentum serves as a coordinating device, offering high 
returns as a result of growth.  Less developed projects offer greater returns for the 
same rate of investment making them more attractive than a more developed project 
receiving equal funding.  One pattern to emerge from the particular parameter 
settings of simulation 3 is that the benefit of momentum in a mature project is 
insufficient to maintain interest in the project through to completion.  The robustness 
of this outcome is discussed in Section 3.2.4.  Investors become attracted to immature 
projects offering high returns despite their low investment.  Plotting series produced 
near the end of the simulation, Figure 7 shows a pattern of investing that produces 
pools of stagnant projects, many of which become dormant before completion. 
 Table 2 reports that on average about 140 projects are developed during the 
sample run.  There is a substantial waste of resources in repeatedly developing 
projects only to have them become dormant.  Somewhat perversely, the great 
accuracy of the momentum strategy in predicting one period ahead paper returns 
compounds the problem by giving the momentum investors great confidence. 
3.2.3 Simulations with mixed population strategies 
 The markets in simulations 4 and 5 are initiated with an equal number of 
investors of both types.  Simulation 4 is based on the fundamental investors receiving 
a noise free signal of the maturity value while simulation 5 has the same investors 
receiving a noisy signal.  Ownership of the economy's output is initially evenly 
divided between the two groups, but evolves according to the ownership of the 
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 matured projects. 
 As reported in Table 2, the momentum investor’s percent ownership of the 
economy’s resources declines during the course of the simulation, averaging about 
36% at termination.  Figure 8 displays the rθ  values, and Figure 9 adds a new frame 
to the basic time-series figure, separately displaying ik for each trader type. 
 The inferior relative performance of the momentum investors and the overall 
reduced aggregate performance of the market relative to simulation 1 is attributable 
to the momentum investors’ project selection and abandonment.  Though the 
fundamental investors are a social planner’s obvious choice for selecting which 
projects to develop next, they are also motivated to complete projects that are already 
developed.  The momentum investors’ attraction to young projects means they 
initiate investment in the market’s next project.  Often they abandon these projects 
before completion.  Low valued, partially developed projects typically do not attract 
the fundamental investors who instead choose a high maturity value project from the 
undeveloped pool.  The development and abandonment of low valued projects results 
in the waste of the economy’s resources. 
 Even though they are a detriment to the economy, momentum investors have 
the potential to outperform the fundamental investors.  Investing in young projects 
means that ownership is acquired cheaply.  When the momentum investors happen 
upon a high quality project, the fundamental investors develop the project to 
maturity.  The low value of ownership reported in Table 2 suggests that on average 
the momentum traders lose more through waste than they gain from early investment, 
but this outcome is reversed in some runs of simulation 4.  Adding noise to the 
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 fundamental trader signal reverses this outcome, as found in simulation 5. 
 As revealed by simulation 2, noise in the signals hampers the ability of the 
fundamental investors as a group to settle confidently on a single project to develop.  
Mixing the momentum investors with the fundamental investors has the potential to 
improve economic performance when the fundamental investors receive noisy 
information.  Though the individual fundamental investors possess heterogeneous 
information on the value of each project, aggregation filters the errors, leaving 
observed returns as a reasonable indicator of the consensus best project.  The 
momentum investors can then facilitate coordination by investing on the project 
earning the highest return. 
 Unfortunately, behavior in simulation 5 does not match this idealized 
potential.  As can be seen in Figure 4, while coordination helps the investors to pick 
out the highest value project, the highest returns are still realized by the least 
developed project.  The momentum investors fail to follow the lead of the 
fundamental investors.  The momentum investors end up determining which project 
to initiate investment through their ability to coordinate on the least developed 
project.  With the fundamental investors receiving noisy information, all projects are 
developed through to completion so the momentum strategy is not hampered by its 
own lack of follow through.  The presence of the fundamental investors improves the 
performance of the momentum investors.  Aggregate output is extremely low relative 
to simulation 2 but an improvement over simulation 3. 
 No parameter values examined were able to produce an environment in which 
the presence of the momentum investors improved performance relative to a market 
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 populated exclusively by fundamental investors.  Simulations 6 and 7 are based on a 
market environment that favors initial project selection by fundamental investors.  
This is accomplished by setting d0 to 0.2 and σ  to 10 so that new projects no longer 
offer high returns.  Simulation 6 has only the fundamental investors while simulation 
7 is populated by both types.  The market in simulation 7 evolves to the point at 
which the momentum investors, follow the lead of the fundamental investors but 
economic performance still suffers relative to simulation 6.  The momentum 
investors continue to abandon projects prior to completion in order to invest in 
younger projects.  This behavior disrupts the market sufficiently so that the 
fundamental investors suffer low accuracy.  The low accuracy ensures a modest level 
of development of even the low valued projects.  Figure 10 reveals the market’s 
inability to coordinate to produce growth in the most mature projects.  On the other 
hand, the fundamental investors benefit from the presence of the momentum 
investors.  Though the economy from simulation 7 is smaller than that produced by 
simulation 6, it is better to own 1/10 of the fundamentalists’ 78% share of the 




3.2.4 Robustness of the simulation results 
 Two parameters that strongly influence the nature of the investment market in 
simulation are d0 and δ. 
 If d0 is set sufficiently high, then momentum investors remain focused on 
developing a single project through to completion.  Selection remains arbitrary so 
that the momentum investors match the base case level of economic performance.  If 
the fundamental investors are also present, they may be able to lead project selection 
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 as in simulation 7. 
 Set δ low, and unattractive projects remain active but undeveloped, blocking 
the introduction of new projects.  The fundamental investors’ ability to discern 
between projects becomes moot due to the formation of a pool of low valued 
projects.  Performance by the fundamental investors is reduced to match the base 
case.  With both investor types present, the lower δ allows the momentum investors 
to grow to dominate the market quickly.  The fundamental investors are reduced to 
selecting the best project from the pool of partially developed projects. 
4. Conclusion 
 The solution to the central planner's problem demonstrates that concentrating 
the economy’s resources on a single project is superior to distributing the economy’s 
resources among a large number of projects.  This result is true whether or not there 
is uncertainty in the value of the project upon completion.  In a decentralized market, 
individual investors face greater uncertainty in their investment decision than the 
central planner due to the uncertainty associated with the investment decisions of the 
other investors. 
 In simulation, exclusive use of either fundamental or momentum strategies 
produces coordination among the population of traders.  The fundamental approach 
works well in coordinating investment on high valued projects and developing those 
projects to completion.  Noisy private signals diminish economic performance.  The 
investors lack the confidence to invest exclusively in the project with the greatest 
value.  The momentum investors are very good at coordinating, since they are all 
acting on the same information, but develop an investment pattern that fails to 
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 develop the economy.  Partially developed projects become dormant due to investors’ 
abandonment as they become distracted by the small gains, but high growth rate, 
offered by less developed projects. 
 The fundamental investors tend to outperform the momentum investors in 
simulations populated by both types when they receive sufficiently accurate private 
signals.  The momentum investors tend to perform well relative to the fundamental 
investors when the private signals are noisy.  In both cases, the presence of the 
momentum investors disrupts the learning process of the fundamental investors, 
hampering their ability to develop the economy successfully.  Further, the relative 
success of a strategy that produces the inferior outcome suggests that markets are not 
always capable of rewarding good investment strategies. 
Appendix 
A.1 Further discussion of the optimal investment path for the central 
planner 
 The solution expressed in (4) characterizes the optimal consumption stream, 
tk to t(k+1).  A closed form solution to the optimal path is not solved.  The standard 
optimal control problem has a salvage value that is exogenous or endogenous to the 
terminal value of the state variable.  The value of V  on the RHS of (4) is 
endogenous to the consumption/investment decision made in t > tk, and thus it fails to 
establish a fixed endpoint condition to the problem expressed in (3).  Since the 
optimal decision rule expressed in (4) holds for each of the subsequent projects, the 
problem is again recursive.  Let  
)( tkd
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    ∫ − ρ−− = )( )1( * )(),( kt kt tttk dtcuekcX
indicate the present discounted value of the stream of utility derived during the 
endogenously determined period t(k-1) and t(k) along the optimal consumption path.  
Given that c  anchors the remainder of the consumption path, , the economy 














A.2 Proof of Proposition 1 
 The LHS of (4) captures the marginal cost of reducing consumption in order 
to invest in project k.  Concavity in u ensures that increasing total investment 
increases costs, regardless of which project is being financed.  The return to 
investment, f, is either linear or concave.  If concave, then heavy investment in a 
single project increases the marginal cost of investing in that project without affecting 
the cost of the other projects.  The concavity of u and f ensure that the marginal cost 
of investing is increasing and convex in it though individual projects face different 
costs that are increasing in the rate of investment, i . kt
 The RHS of (4) captures the marginal benefit.  Investment in project k brings 
the project closer to completion by changing tk in the discounting of the RHS.  The 
value upon completion is constant.  The marginal benefit to increasing investment in 
project k is increasing but concave.  The maximum benefit is achieved when all the 
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 economy’s output is used on project k’s development.6  For i  ≤ , the increasing 
marginal benefit ensures that diverting resources away from project j towards project 





 For linear f it is optimal to direct investment resources to a single project.  
Concavity in f can attenuate this by increasing the marginal cost at high levels of 
investment in a single project.  If this is the case, then investment may optimally be 
directed towards a secondary (tertiary, etc.) project for which the lower marginal cost 
compensates for the lower marginal benefit. 
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 Figure 1: Evolution of 1+θr, fundamental investors only.  Simulation 1, run #5. 
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 Figure 4: Evolution of 1+θr, fundamental investors with noisy signal.  Simulation 2, run #5. 
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 Figure 8: Evolution of 1+θr, fundamental and momentum investors.  Simulation 4, run #5. 
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Figure 10: Evolution of 1+θr, fundamental and momentum investors. Simulation 6, run #5. 
 
